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ENHANCING THE SENSES: HOW TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCES SHAPE OUR VIEW OF THE LAW
Steven Goldberg*
It is a distinct honor for me to deliver the Edward G. Donley Memorial
Lecture as part of this important symposium on forensic and biometric ad-
vances. **West Virginia University has a well-deserved national - indeed, in-
ternational - reputation in these fields, owing to your bachelor of science degree
program in Forensic and Investigative Sciences, your university-wide Forensic
Science Initiative, and your Biometric Knowledge Center, among other activi-
ties. I have a learned a great deal from the presentations over the last two days.
I wanted to speak today on Enhancing the Senses: How Technological
Advances Shape Our View of the Law. Technology often enables us to see
where we could not see before. When, in 1609, Galileo pointed his telescope at
the moon, new worlds opened up.' Today, advances in fields ranging from iris
scanning to voice recognition are opening up more new worlds, and new chal-
lenges as well for our legal system.
In this lecture I hope to show how, just as the telescope provided new
perspectives, a careful look at some familiar legal ideas can also show some
surprising implications for research, development, and deployment for forensics
and biometrics.
Let's begin with the funding of research. In recent months there has
been a resurgence of interest in giving the President of the United States the
line-item veto. Perhaps no topic seems more remote from this symposium, but I
think a close look will show there is an important connection.
In most states, when the governor receives a spending bill, he can veto
individual line items that he believes are wasteful. 2 In 1996, Congress gave the
President the power to do the same thing.3 In 1998, however, in the case of
Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court found the line item veto uncon-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
This manuscript is based on the Edward G. Donley Memorial Lecture given by Steven
Goldberg on March 28, 2006 at the West Virginia University College of Law as part of the West
Virginia Law Review symposium, "Brave New World - Developing the Legal Frontier in Light of
Forensic and Biometric Advances."
I The Adventure Begun by Galileo, httpJ/www.pd.astro.it/e-mostra/gl l00man.htm (last
visited May 23, 2006).
2 Fact Sheet: President Submits Line Item Veto Act to Congress,
http.J/www.whitehouse.gov/newsreleases/2006103/20060306-7.html (last visited May 23, 2006).
3 Id.
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stitutional on the ground that under the U.S. Constitution the President has to
sign or veto an entire bill.4
On March 6, 2006, President Bush proposed new legislation that he be-
lieved could survive Supreme Court review.5 The prospects for passage are
considerable - President Bush's idea is supported by, among others, Senator
John Kerry, Bush's opponent in the last presidential election. Under the new
proposal, the President could take out any line item in a spending bill, and send
it back to Congress for an up or down majority vote.7 This would force Con-
gress to go on record for individual projects rather than being able to lump them
all together.
Now suppose the line item veto is passed and upheld in court. Over
time, Presidents will be drawn to vetoing line items that the public would find
silly and wasteful. And that's where the danger to basic research comes in. It is
the easiest thing in the world for politicians to make fun of pointy-headed basic
research that has no obvious immediate application. Years ago, Senator Wil-
liam Proxmire used to give "Golden Fleece" awards to spending he regarded as
wasteful. I studied his awards, and I found that he liked to single out relatively
inexpensive basic research grants. 8 Here, for example is how Proxmire de-
scribed a study of aggression in primates that focused on when animals clench
their jaws:
The funding of this nonsense makes me almost angry enough to
scream and kick or even clench my jaw. It seems to me it is
outrageous. Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpay-
ers as well as his monkeys grind their teeth. In fact, the good
doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process
made a monkey out of the American taxpayer.9
Now studies of aggression in animals can have real benefits; they can,
in fact, lead to medicines that help thousands. Imagine how much more vulner-
able to ridicule an odd sounding study of something like utilizing artificial intel-
ligence models to study algorithms used in processing sensory data might be.
4 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
5 Fact Sheet: President Submits Line Item Veto Act to Congress, supra note 2.
6 Bush to Try for Line Item Veto, CBS NEWS,
http//www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/06/politics/main 1 372906.shtml (last visited May 23,
2006).
7 Id.
8 STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA 53-54
(1994)[hereinafter CULTURE CLASH]. Although the spending programs singled out by former
Senator Proxmire were typically individual grants awarded by agencies rather than line items in
the federal budget, the problem is the same: it is easy for politicians to make fun of basic re-
search.
9 Id. at 54.
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But this sort of basic research in pattern recognition could have enormous im-
portance down the road for biometric techniques such as voice recognition,'
1
techniques that could prove vital in recognizing terrorists. Today, there are line
items in the budget that relate to biometrics1" and they could be vulnerable.
I am not interested here in whether the new line item veto bill is consti-
tutional or even whether it is wise. My point is simply this: basic research will
have a large say in the future of biometrics and forensics. And we should never
take its popularity for granted. Most countries barely fund basic science at all; it
is a fragile flower. Whether or not there is a line item veto, those who want to
see a bright future for biometrics have to be active in promoting and protecting
its research base.
Let's turn now to the typical way science and technology are funded in
the United States.' 2 Typically, Congress passes and the President signs authori-
zation and appropriation bills that operate on a department by department ba-
sis. 13 In other words, the Defense Department appropriation bill contains,
among many other things, money for research and development, as does the
Health and Human Services budget, the Department of Energy budget, the Na-
tional Science Foundation budget, and so on. 14 The big story here is one of de-
centralization.' 5 Despite various proposals going back over a century, the
United States, unlike many other countries, has never created a Department of
Science.
16
As a result, there is overlap in the research efforts of the various agen-
cies. And sometimes "overlap" is a polite term for duplication. Presently, for
example, research and development on facial recognition technology is carried
out by a variety of cabinet agencies, including State, Justice, Energy and De-
fense. ' Under the circumstances, it is important that federal efforts be coordi-
nated through such groups as the White House Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy.
Now I've been talking about government funding of research. Of
course, scientists are not required to obtain such funding. Suppose a researcher
has controversial views that the key agency decision makers believe are not well
grounded in science. He might believe, for example, that he can determine
whether a suspect under interrogation is lying by analyzing subtle changes in the
10 Pattern Recognition, www.aaai.org/ArTopics/html/pattem.html (last visited May 31, 2006).
11 See, e.g., RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet,
www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2006/OSD/0603826D8Z.pdf at 32 (last visited May 23, 2006).
12 CULTURE CLASH, supra note 8, at 44-49.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Federal Funding for Selected Surveillance Technologies,
www.gao.gov/new.items/d02438r.pdf (last visited May 23, 2006).
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heat emissions from the suspect's body. No one will fund him because they do
not agree with him on the underlying science. Still, two basic realities remain.
First, the scientist can give speeches and publish papers trying to per-
suade the government and the society that he is right. The First Amendment
protection for free speech extends to scientific speech. 18 And this is something
we should not take for granted. The former Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany
had formidable scientific research programs that were hampered because no one
in those countries was allowed to question the dominant scientific wisdom. 19
The second reality is that our unpopular biometrics researcher can carry
out experiments if he can obtain private funding and if his research does not
endanger public health and safety. Perhaps then his ideas will gain wider sup-
port.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that money is vital for scientific research
and, for fundamental research, where the payoffs are distant and uncertain, the
federal government remains a vital source of funding. With regard to science,
the federal government has more power than it does in other fields. It would be
unconstitutional for the government to fund the presidential campaign of the
Republican, but not the Democratic party. But the government can fund one
approach to polygraph research and not another.
This extraordinary government power suggests that a Department of
Science would be a dangerous idea. Although it might look better on an organi-
zation chart, we don't want to put all of our eggs in one basket in the uncertain
world of basic research funding. If various agencies take a variety of ap-
proaches, we may end up better off in the long run.2°
Let us now look at what happens when research leads to applications,
and biometric and forensic advances enter society. I want to focus here on con-
stitutional issues. In keeping with the theme of enhancing our vision, let's put
off for a moment our discussion of searches and informational privacy, and look
in some less familiar places.
In fact, let's begin with the first words of the First Amendment: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. 2 1 Religious freedom is a cherished part of American
history and culture, but it can at times come into conflict with other values.
About two years ago, a number of Muslim women in Alabama protested
when state officials made them remove their head scarves before taking their
photos for a driver's license.22 The women had a religious obligation to wear
18 CULTURE CLASH, supra note 8, at 28-31.
19 On the disastrous influence of Lysenko on Soviet biology, see NIs ROLL-HANSEN, THE
LYSENKO EFFEcr: THE PoLmcs OF SCIENCE (2005). On the cost to German science of Nazi anti-
semitism, see JEAN MEDAWAR & DAVID PYKE, HITLER'S GiFT: THE TRUE STORY OF THE
Scm'rnSTS EXPELLED BY THE NAzI REGIME (2000).
20 See CULTURE CLASH, supra note 8, at 53.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. L
22 Alabama Muslims Denied right to Islamic Attire, http:/www.cair-
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their hijab or head scarf.23 The photograph on a driver's license is a kind of
biometric identifier, and, in the future, it may be routinely linked to more elabo-
rate electronic recognition systems.
How does our society resolve this kind of conflict between religious ex-
pression and the law? If the government singles out a religious practice and
bans it because it disagrees with the religion in question, that is a clear violation
of free exercise. 24 But what if a neutral state law that serves a valid governmen-
tal purpose runs up against a religious practice, as happened in the driver's li-
cense case? No one claims that the requirement of a photograph on a driver's
license was aimed at discriminating against Islam.
As a matter of federal constitutional law, a neutral statute of this type
can be applied despite religious objections, in other words, the free exercise
challenge will fail.25 Many states follow this approach as well, although some
hold, as a matter of state law, that the religious practice will be allowed unless
there is a compelling state interest in applying the statute to the religious
group.
26
But perhaps most importantly, in a case like the drivers license problem
in Alabama, the government is free to carve out an exemption for a religious
practice if it so chooses. 27 Our society allows the government to accommodate
strongly held religious beliefs when possible.
And, in fact, after complaints from the Muslim women, Alabama au-
thorities began to look more closely at their state law that required that no one
could wear a head covering when they had their driver's license photo taken.
Did all head coverings really cause a problem when you are identifying some-
one by looking at a driver's license? The Muslim head scarf covers the
woman's hair, but not her face. And under Alabama law, nothing prevented a
woman from wearing a wig when her driver's license photo was taken. Finally,
a compromise was reached and the Alabama law was changed to allow an ex-
ception to the no head covering rule in cases of genuine religious need. The
head still had to be visible from the top of the forehead to the bottom of the chin
and the hairline had to be visible from side to side. The Islamic women were
delighted. And Alabama's policy came in to line with the majority of the states
that have considered this issue.
net.org/default.asp?Page=articleView&id=158&theType=AA (last visited May 23, 2006).
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
25 Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
26 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 3-5
(2000).
27 Id.
28 After Protests, Alabama Scraps Driving License Hijab Ban
httpJ/www.islamonline.net/English/News/2004-02/21/article02.shtml (last visited May 23, 2006).
The new Alabama policy also allowed medical exceptions to its photograph requirements. Id.
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When we look even more closely, we will see that this resolution dem-
onstrates an important and, to some, controversial feature of American law.
Under Alabama law today, you can wear a head covering when your driver's
license photo is taken if you have a religious reason, but you cannot wear a head
covering if you have a political or artistic or cultural reason. This is not an ex-
ception for everyone. It is not even-handed. It quite clearly favors religion over
other forms of activity. The same is true when the government, as it does in
many states, says that Native Americans can use peyote, an otherwise illegal
drug, in their religious rituals. These states do not allow individuals to use pe-
yote for philosophical or political reasons.29
This is allowed because religion is special in the American system.
30
The Constitution singles out the free exercise of religion for protection. Thus
legislators are often free to accommodate religious expression, 3' and biometric
and forensic technologies are more likely to flourish when their implementation
does accommodate religion to the extent possible. Needlessly pushing a tech-
nology against religious values is every bit as unwise as pushing it against pri-
vacy values. In the end, no technology can survive, nor should it, if it does not
gain a basic level of public support.
If religious freedom often gets less attention than privacy in discussions
of new technologies, the same could be said of the First Amendment rights to
free speech and assembly. The Constitution says that Congress shall "make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech.., or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 32 To
understand the implications of this for our purposes, we have to go back to a
civil rights case in 1958.
In that year, the United States Supreme Court set aside an Alabama
court order requiring the NAACP to publicly disclose its membership list.33
The Court found that the order infringed on the rights of free expression and
association because "revelation of the identity of [NAACP] rank-and-file mem-
bers has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment,
threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. ' 34
More recently, the Court struck down a Los Angeles law requiring any
publicly distributed handbill to identify its author,35 as well as an Ohio ban on
anonymous campaign literature.36 These results are consistent with one of the
29 See generally Christopher Parker, A Constitutional Examination of the Federal Exemptions
for Native American Religious Peyote Use, 16 BYU J. PuB. L. 89 (2001).
30 See generally McConnell, supra note 26.
31 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
34 Id. at 462.
35 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
3 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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most famous chapters in our Nation's political history, the Federalist Papers.
The Federalist Papers, which rallied support for the Constitution and play a role
in its interpretation to this day, were published under pseudonyms.
37
In 1999, the Court decided a case which brings us close to the intersec-
tion with the technologies we are concerned with today. In Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Found., Inc., the Court invalidated, on the authority of the
earlier cases I described, a Colorado requirement that individuals circulating
ballot initiative petitions wear a badge bearing their name.38 The Court noted
that ballot initiatives were often controversial and that the requirement deterred
people from participating in the political process.39
Now imagine an automated facial recognition technology that can scan
a political rally and reliably tell the government the names of the people attend-
ing that rally. In theory, it would be like making everyone at that rally wear a
name tag. The 1999 decision would be meaningless if you could tell the names
of the people seeking names on a ballot initiative not by requiring a name tag
but rather by scanning their faces into an automated system.40 Of course, any-
one who appears in public runs the risk that they will be recognized, but the
Court's decisions hold that the government cannot increase that risk by requir-
ing name tags, and a facial recognition system would appear to raise similar
problems.
Now at this point I think it is essential to emphasize that the technology
I am discussing is not the problem: it is the use of the technology. Indeed, a
reliable facial recognition system could reduce infringements on First Amend-
ment liberties. Let me explain.
The real question here is the government's interest in scanning a crowd
in the first place. If the government is infiltrating a political rally because it
wants to undermine legitimate political opposition to its policies, we have a ma-
jor free speech and assembly problem whether the government is using secret
informants, a requirement that citizens wear name tags, or an automated facial
recognition system. We are dealing with a government abusing its powers, and
we hope that our system is robust enough to stop such abuses.
So let's turn to the more conceptually difficult case, where the govern-
ment has a valid interest in scanning a crowd, even at a political rally. Perhaps
the government has received a specific reliable threat of a terrorist attack that
will endanger those at the rally as well as citizens nearby. Imagine that the gov-
ernment has a photograph of the terrorist who is planning to carry out the threat.
37 See, e.g., Peter E. Quint, The Federalist Papers and the Constitution of the United States, 77
Ky. L.J. 369 (1989).
38 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
39 Id. at 197-98.
40 See John A. Stefani, Finding Waldo: Face Recognition Software and Concerns Regarding
Anonymity and Public Political Speech, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 173, 186 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds.,
2006).
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Here, the government could use undercover agents, armed with the photograph,
to look for the suspect. But, people are not always very good at matching a pho-
tograph to a face, 41 and the agents may, consciously or not, fall back on stereo-
types, including racial stereotypes, in deciding who to stop and question, thus
offending citizens while missing the real suspect. If - and it's a big if - an
automated facial recognition system could do better in terms of avoiding mis-
takes, it could also avoid racial stereotypes and safeguard citizens while protect-
ing their rights.
So technology intersects with freedom of religion and freedom of
speech, and in both cases distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate
government programs is vital. Let's turn now to the more familiar area of
search and seizure.
In some settings, biometric technologies, such as those that recognize
faces or how people walk, can be deployed without the traditional requirement
of a warrant based on probable cause. In so-called administrative searches,
where the government is carrying out health and safety functions rather than
focusing on a criminal investigation, the Fourth Amendment requires only that
the search be reasonable.42
The leading case here, the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Donovan
v. Dewey, arose in the context of mine safety.43 Under federal law, inspectors
can show up at mines unannounced and with no probable cause. They have to
be let in. The Court upheld this, noting the commercial setting, the pervasive
government regulation of mines, and, most importantly, the fact that the agency
in question had procedures to assure the fair implementation of its inspection
system.44 In other words, administrative law principles prevented the govern-
ment from repeatedly searching one mine, perhaps because the owner was po-
litically unpopular, while ignoring other mines. This administrative framework
justifies the extensive searches, using a variety of techniques, that we see at air-
ports and elsewhere.
Another area where traditional probable cause is not required, with pos-
sible implications for new technologies, is when the police simply stop an indi-
vidual for questioning. In 1968, in the case of Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court
held that the police could stop an individual and pat him down to make sure he
was not carrying a weapon if they had "reasonable suspicion" that something
was amiss. 45 "Reasonable suspicion" is less than probable cause, but, the Court
41 See, e.g., Connie Mayer, Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Based on
Pretrial Photographic Arrays, 13 PACE L. REV. 815, 820 (1994) ("Mhe photograph is merely a
two-dimensional depiction of a person. Often a witness cannot discern height and weight accu-
rately from a photograph. If the photograph is old and no longer accurately depicts its subject, it
may also lead to a false identification.").
42 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
43 Id.
I id. at 604-06.
45 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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reasoned, the "stop and frisk" they were authorizing was less intrusive than a
full-blown search.
In 2004, a deeply divided 5-4 Supreme Court extended Terry in the case
of Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court.47 Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove of Hum-
boldt County, Nevada set out to investigate a telephone call which alleged that a
man in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road had assaulted a
woman. When Dove found the truck, with a woman sitting in it and a man
standing beside it, he asked the man for identification. The man refused. Even-
tually, after warning the man that he could be arrested for failing to provide his
name, Dove arrested the individual.
The arrested individual, one Larry Dudley Hiibel, was convicted and
fined $250 under Nevada law for having obstructed a police officer by failing to
identify himself. In some, but not all, states it is a crime to fail to identify your-
self when stopped by a law enforcement official.48 Hiibel argued that his Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights had been violated, but five members of the U. S.
Supreme Court disagreed.49
Terry v. Ohio held that the police could stop and frisk you. It left open
the question of whether you could be forced to identify yourself. In Hiibel, Jus-
tice Kennedy reasoned that you could, since the intrusion was not great and
knowing the identity of a suspect could clear them, or alert the police to a do-
mestic disturbance problem, or otherwise serve valid state goals.50 Justice Ste-
vens, in dissent, raised a concern relevant to us here when he wrote, "A name
can provide the key to a broad array of information about the person, particu-
larly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement
databases. 51 We might add that new technologies, such as facial recognition,
could link you to such a database even if you do not give your name.
After Hiibel, individual states have the freedom to decide whether to re-
quire citizens to give their names when stopped by the police in the absence of
probable cause. And they will also make the initial decisions about the deploy-
ment of more advanced identification technologies in the stop and frisk setting.
If they make those decisions with sensible consideration of the accuracy of their
systems and of public attitudes, then they will enjoy more long-term success
than if they try to ram a system down the public's throat.
So searches in regulated areas, such as airports, and minor intrusions,
such as "stop and frisk" encounters, are generally associated with government
victories in court. Unsurprisingly, we begin to see the government losing cases
46 Id. at 25-26.
47 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
48 Id. at 182-83.
49 Id. at 185, 189.
50 Id. at 186.
51 Id. at 196.
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more often when the traditional requirement of probable cause comes into play,
particularly when the police are searching a private home.
This, of course, was the setting for the Supreme Court's 2001 decision
in Kyllo v. United States,52 a case with direct relevance to biometric and forensic
technologies. In Kyllo, Agent William Elliott of the United States Department
of the Interior suspected that marijuana was being grown in the home of Danny
Kyllo in Florence, Oregon. Because he lacked the probable cause necessary to
obtain a search warrant, Elliott, along with another federal agent, sat in a car
across the street from Kyllo's home and used a thermal imager - an Agema
Thermovision 210 - to scan the residence. The imager detected infrared radia-
tion coming from Kyllo's house, which revealed that the roof over the garage
and a side wall of the house were relatively hot compared with the rest of the
house and with neighboring houses. Agent Elliott concluded that Kyllo was
using halide lights to grow marijuana in his home.
Using the results from the imager along with other information, Elliott
obtained a warrant for a search from a Federal Magistrate Judge. Once inside
Kyllo's home, federal agents found a marijuana growing operation that involved
more than 100 plants. Kyllo appealed his marijuana manufacturing conviction
on the ground that use of the thermal imager without probable cause constituted
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Su-
preme Court agreed with Kyllo.
53
The Court was divided 5-4 in the Kyllo case. Justice Scalia's opinion
for the majority emphasized the traditional protection the Fourth Amendment
provides for the home. But, Scalia recognized that visual surveillance of the
home without probable cause has long been allowed, noting that the Court has
held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment ... has never been extended to require law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public
thoroughfares." 54
Moreover, Scalia conceded that "[i]t would be foolish to contend that
the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology., 55 For example, in 1986 the
Court upheld aerial surveillance of a fenced back-yard on the ground that "[i]n
an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is
unreasonable to expect" that your back-yard is private.56
So if an agent in an airplane can survey your back-yard, what is wrong
with Agent Elliott using a thermal imager from across the street? The difference
is your expectation of privacy about the inside of your house. The Court
reached this conclusion by relying on its 1967 decision in Katz v. United
52 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
53 Id. at 40.
54 Id. at 32.
55 Id. at 33-34.
56 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
[Vol. 109
ENHANCING THE SENSES
States.57 Katz upheld a Fourth Amendment challenge to warrantless eaves-
dropping by a listening device placed on the outside of a telephone booth on the
theory that Katz had justifiably relied on the privacy of the booth.58 The Katz
test holds that "a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government vio-
lates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable., 59
Scalia's opinion for the Court in Kyllo recognized that changing societal
expectations of privacy shape Fourth Amendment rights under Katz.6° In other
words, if law enforcement officials and others were routinely scanning the infra-
red emissions coming from your house, you would not be justified in believing
that using a heat source inside the house was a private affair. The Court twice
noted that the search of Danny Kyllo's home was being set aside in part because
thermal imaging devices are "not in general public use.
'
,
6 1
The four dissenting Justices did not believe that any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy enjoyed by Danny Kyllo had been violated in this case. They
felt Kyllo had no privacy interest in heat emissions that were, after all, being
sensed after they had left his house. In the dissenters' view, Agent Elliott's use
of a "fairly primitive thermal imager" was the same as if he had noticed that
Kyllo's house was warmer than a nearby building because "snow melts at dif-
ferent rates across its surfaces. 62
Two main lessons for new technology emerge from Kyllo. The first is
that as a technology becomes widespread, our constitutional zone of privacy
shrinks. The majority in Kyllo does not deny this aspect of the Katz test. As we
have seen, it implied that if the thermal imager had been in common use it
would have upheld the search. Thus, if someday a device that analyzes voices
can reach from across the street into your living room, and use of that device
becomes widespread, the Fourth Amendment will have little application.
If the first lesson supports the use of intrusive technologies, the second
cuts in the other direction. All nine Justices in Kyllo expressed concern about
future technologies that impinge on privacy. The lesson here is that crucial pub-
lic support for such technologies will be lacking unless they are deployed and
monitored in a way that protects societal values.
It is not surprising that the majority made this point. In the course of
holding that the search was improper, Justice Scalia said that "[w]hile the tech-
nology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in develop-
ment., 63 He then detailed what he had in mind:
57 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
58 Id. at 353.
59 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 34, 40.
62 Id. at 41, 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 36.
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The ability to "see" through walls and other opaque barriers is a
clear, and scientifically feasible, goal of law enforcement re-
search and development. The National Law Enforcement and
Corrections Technology Center, a program within the United
States Department of Justice, features on its Internet Website
projects that include a "Radar-Based Through-the-Wall Surveil-
lance System," "Handheld Ultrasound Through the Wall Sur-
veillance," and a "Radar Flashlight" that "will enable law en-
forcement officers to detect individuals through interior build-
ing walls." 64
But it was not just the majority that was concerned about emerging
technologies and privacy. Although the dissenters in Kyllo would have allowed
the use of the thermal imager, they did not believe that any technology could be
used simply on the ground that it is only enhancing our senses. Justice Ste-
vens's opinion for the four dissenters noted that:
Although the Court is properly and commendably concerned
about the threats to privacy that may flow from advances in the
technology available to the law enforcement profession, it has
unfortunately failed to heed the tried and true counsel of judicial
restraint. Instead of concentrating on the rather mundane issue
that is actually presented by the case before it, the Court has en-
deavored to craft an all-encompassing rule for the future. It
would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity
to grapple with these emerging issues rather than to shackle
them with prematurely devised constitutional constraints.65
So while the majority in Kyllo wanted to step in now, the dissent wanted
to let the legislatures have the first crack at limiting future developments. Either
way, the lesson for public policy is clear: unless biometric applications are
strongly justified and carefully limited, vital public assent will be lacking.
Let us turn now from searches to the most discussed aspect of biometric
and forensic technologies - the broad questions of privacy raised whenever the
government maintains information on its citizens. Even if information is validly
obtained for an important social purpose, how can we be sure that the informa-
tion will not be used in improper ways? The constitutional issue here concerns
what is called informational privacy. While there is no square holding on the
subject, the Supreme Court has suggested that the due process clause may obli-
gate the government to use reasonable measures to assure that information in
64 Id. at 36 n.3.
65 Id. at 51 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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government databases not be used for unauthorized purposes in ways that would
impair an individual's privacy.66
The suggestion came in 1977 in the Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe.
67
Under New York law, prescriptions for legitimate but addictive drugs had to be
recorded on a computer database. The state used the database in an effort to
prevent these drugs from being diverted into unlawful channels. The state
wanted, for example, to make sure that "unscrupulous pharmacists [were not]
repeatedly refilling prescriptions.
'
"
68
Although the computer system was designed to prevent leaks, and pub-
lic disclosure of a patient's identity was made a crime, a privacy rights chal-
lenge to the system was brought by those who feared that the information could
leak out and that patients would be stigmatized as addicts. The statute was up-
held, with the Court noting that the New York system was set up to protect pri-
vacy and that there was no evidence that information had fallen into the wrong
hands. 69 But in his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens suggested that future
databases might not be constitutionally acceptable if they were not adequately
protected against improper use:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the ac-
cumulation of vast amounts of personal information in comput-
erized data banks or other massive government files ...The
right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to
avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some cir-
cumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution,
nevertheless New York's statutory scheme ...evidence[s] a
proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest
in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not, decide any ques-
tion which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of
accumulated private data, whether intentional or unintentional,
or by a system that did not contain comparable security provi-
sions. We simply hold that this record does not establish an in-
vasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.70
This suggestion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects informational privacy means that a government biometric data-
base with inadequate safeguards could be challenged by an individual in that
66 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 592.
69 Id. at 601.
70 Id. at 605-06.
2006]
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
database on the theory that the government had violated his rights. Regardless
of whether a court challenge would succeed, it is obvious that the public wants
protection from unwarranted disclosures from databases. Biometric databases
will be judged by that standard.
Consider, for example, a large federal agency that decides to use retinal
scanning to control entrance to the workplace every morning. The information
obtained from the scan is stored in digital form. There are two related concerns
here. First, information from retinal scans might reveal health information, such
as whether an individual has diabetes. 7' The federal agency did not justify its
access screening program on an assessment of anyone's health, so it would be
troubling if the agency were using that health information in deciding, for ex-
ample, who got promotions. The second concern is that the information from
the scan could leak out, so unauthorized entities could obtain identity informa-
tion and health information concerning unsuspecting employees. Obviously, it
is in everyone's interest to limit this biometric to its authorized uses, and to pre-
vent leaks of the biometric information.
Even when information from new technologies is gathered and main-
tained lawfully, there may be a further question of its admissibility in court.
You have heard a good deal at this conference about the admissibility of scien-
tific information under the Frye test, 72 which is used in some states, and the
Daubert test, 73 which is used in other states and in the federal system.74 Both
are designed to provide a reasonable assurance of reliability for our trial system,
and both divide functions between the judge and the jury. Basically, as you
know, the judge serves as a gatekeeper. Some expert evidence is deemed so
unreliable that the jury simply cannot hear it; other expert evidence can go to the
jury subject to cross-examination and the testimony of opposing experts. This
approach is applied to biometrics ranging from polygraphs to DNA.
I just want to make one observation about this field: the case-by-case
gatekeeper role by the trial judge, with all of its inevitable uncertainties and lack
of uniformity, is not going to go away.
Occasionally I meet true believers on either side of the debate about the
gatekeeper role, but I find that they are not really willing to go all the way with
their beliefs. There are those who maintain that all expert evidence should go to
the jury. The judge, as gatekeeper, they maintain, may be preventing the jury
from hearing an unpopular point of view that will turn out to be true. The judge,
in other words, might be keeping the next Galileo off the stand. As for unreli-
able or dishonest "experts," we can, they say, rely on cross-examination and
opposing experts to set the jury straight.
71 Anil Jane, Ruud Bolle, and Sharath Pankanti, Introduction to Biometrics, www.cse.msu.ed
u/-cse 891/Sect 601/textbook/l.pdf at 35 (last visited May 30, 2006).
72 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
73 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
74 For a survey of which jurisdictions use which test, see David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D.
Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351 (2004).
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To these true believers, I pose a simple question: should we let defen-
dants in criminal cases present astrologers as witnesses? Could an astrologer
testify, for example, that because the defendant's moon was in the seventh
house, he had no choice but to commit the crime? Here, the true believers
waiver. And it is not because they think the jurors would laugh at astrology. If
that were the case, there would be no danger in allowing the horoscope expert to
take the stand. No, the true believers waiver because they know that the average
juror may be more likely to believe in astrology than he or she is to believe in
the accuracy of modern psychiatry or even modern forensics. In this case, even
the true believers are sufficiently elitist to allow the judge to act as a gatekeeper.
True believers on the other side take a tough guy approach. They want
the trial judges to relentlessly prevent juries from hearing everything they view
as "junk science." Even under Daubert and Frye, they believe juries hear far
too many fringe experts trying to win acquittals for defendants or big judgments
for plaintiffs on the basis of ideas that the mainstream scientific community
believes to be untested and unpersuasive.
To these true believers, I ask whether, in a high profile murder case,
they would have the judge prevent the jury from hearing eyewitness testimony.
After all, if you actually look at the data, the scientific basis for the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony is, to put it politely, far from obvious. 75 Well, they don't
like that idea and in fact, they even resist allowing experts to testify about the
weaknesses of eyewitness testimony.76 All of a sudden these opponents of
"junk science" become born again believers in the historic and vital social role
of the jury, an ancient institution that reflects our society's values, not just im-
personal science.
This example of the inevitable compromises that occur when law meets
science in the courtroom is emblematic of broader truths concerning law and
science throughout our society, from funding issues to the intersection with First
Amendment rights to search and seizures and on to privacy.
Science is concerned with progress, with the accumulation of more and
more testable knowledge about the natural world.77 It values powerful theoreti-
cal structures that can explain a host of phenomena. Newton's theory of gravity
applies not only when you drop an apple, but also when you drop a personal
computer, even though the latter did not exist in Newton's day.
Law is concerned with process, the peaceful resolution of social dis-
putes. Multiple points of view have to be heard, values as well as facts are vital,
and context is crucial. No one would apply the legal system from Newton's day
to our problems. Legal results do not seek to achieve the status of a formula that
applies everywhere on earth.
75 See, e.g., ADULT EYEwrrNEss TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (David F.
Ross et al. eds., 1994).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
77 The contrast in this paragraph and the next between science's emphasis on progress and the
law's focus on process is drawn from CULTURE CLASH, supra note 8, at 6-20.
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The most important single message that comes out of all of this is that
those of us who urge consideration of the social context of science are not anti-
science. You are not helping biometrics if you try to run roughshod over reli-
gious objections, desires for anonymity in political action, or concerns for pri-
vacy. A mindless "pro-science" attitude or a view that "only science matters" is
a recipe for a society where science is does not reach its full potential. Imagine
if, in the 1950's, nuclear engineers paid more attention to social concerns like
the disposal of nuclear waste from reactors. Nuclear energy would not be worse
off today, it would be better off.
78
You know, in 1609, when Galileo pointed his telescope at the moon,
what he saw did not strike everyone as pretty. Aristotle and the Church had
taught for millennia that the moon was a perfectly round sphere. The innocent
in those days were not called pure as the driven snow, they were called pure as
the moon. Galileo, of course, saw that the moon had mountains and craters; it
was far from a perfect sphere.79
When the implications of technology force a scientist to look closely at
the law, he or she sees plenty of mountains and craters; plenty of imperfections
and uncertainties. But we are comfortable with the way the moon really is to-
day, and we can become comfortable with the real world of the law; in fact,
understanding that reality is vital for the future of biometrics and the forensic
sciences. Thank you.
78 CULTURE CLASH, supra note 8, at 96-98.
79 John H. Lienhard, Artist and the Moon, http'//www.uh.edu/engines/epi266.htm (last visited
May 23, 2006).
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